The Evolution of the “ASEAN Way”: Embracing Human Security Perspectives

Brendan Howe and Min Joung Park
Ewha Womans University, South Korea
bmg.howe@gmail.com

Abstract “Human security” is rather a new concept in ASEAN’s security discourse. Unlike the EU that was confronted with intense pressures to adopt human security in the late 1990s, ASEAN has made virtually no reference to human security in its official documents. Instead, it relied on concepts such as “people-centeredness” which can be interpreted with multiple meanings. From the Vientiane Action Programme 2004–2010, the idea of a people-centered ASEAN has been emphasized and introduced as one of the three pillars of ASEAN Community building. In the discourse on ASEAN, the notion of people-centred tends to be employed in connection with certain types of threat, for example, disaster, poverty, environmental issues, diseases, transnational crimes, and trafficking, which are also prominent in the human security literature. Thus, this paper argues that the state-centric, non-interference “ASEAN Way” has been evolving to embrace human security perspectives to an unprecedented degree. It demonstrates that this transformative change has resulted from three main catalysts: transnational challenges in the region, the influence of Japanese development aid, and the role of multilateral “tracked” diplomacy. It concludes that human security is certainly compatible with the new interpretation of the ASEAN Way as the notion of “people-centricity” may be integrated into a strategy to make the public more responsive to the execution of ASEAN policies and to demonstrate the direct benefits for the citizen from cooperation.

Keywords Human Security, ASEAN, the ASEAN way, regional governance

Southeast Asia is a region deeply affected by conflict. Colonial, ideological, and national wars have left their scars and legacies, including disputed borders and divided loyalties. Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, states in the region have looked to minimize the worst manifestations of interstate conflict through emphasizing non-intervention, and domestic governance has emphasized national interest and strength in terms of security and economic growth. Indeed, they remain among the most ardent champions of Westphalian sovereignty (Acharya, 2003, p. 9). At the same time, a Southeast Asian challenge to normative solidarism on human rights can be seen in cultural, economic, and political terms. Culturally,
it asserts that the Western liberal or universalist approach ignores the specific cultural traditions and historical circumstances of Asian societies, whose interpretations of human rights are different from those in the West. Economically, it maintains that the priority of developing Asian societies has to be the eradication of poverty. “Asian values” have been invoked as a form of developmentalism, with the claim that until prosperity is achieved, democracy remains an unaffordable luxury (Thompson, 2004, p. 1085). Politically, it calls into question the motives of the West, accusing them of using human rights merely as an instrument for advancing Western economic or security interests—“power politics in disguise” and a shallow pretense for the use of force against regimes which stand up to Western neo-imperialism (Howe, 2013, p. 51).

An emphasis on state-centricity and national security has certainly featured prominently in the history of the most celebrated regional organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Borchers, 2014). Related academic literature has emphasized the limited and slow pace of international cooperation in the region and remained critical of its significance. Hence, some Asian specialists are skeptical about the Association’s influence (Funston, 1998; Leviter, 2010; Smith, 1999). ASEAN has, however, survived for over 50 years. Moreover, despite extreme power disparities between its member states and external regional players, it has shaped Post-Cold War regional institution-building and has served as a platform of regional cooperation mechanisms around East Asia (Bae, 2014a).

The promotion of regional peace and stability is among the main objectives outlined in the Bangkok Declaration, the Association’s founding document (Borchers, 2014). The declaration, however, refers to security only in terms of external interference (ASEAN, 1967). At the time of the promulgation of the Declaration, alongside interstate conflicts, most of member countries were facing internal threats with potentially regional implications from the turbulent processes of nation building and Cold War dynamics (Borchers, 2014). Strengthening the state was ASEAN’s principal approach to manage internal security challenges as well as push for economic development and maintain regional stability (Bellamy, 2004; Borchers, 2014). Thus, the region has been known for its long embedded state-centric security concept, with the state as the primary unit of analysis, the main actor defining and providing security, and discourse which typically regards the state as the only security referent (Caballero-Anthony, 2004).

The ASEAN Way, the governing principle of member states’ relations in ASEAN, places further emphasis on sovereignty and reinforces the view of the state as the only referent point of security (Nishikawa, 2009; Von Feigenblatt, 2009). Borchers (2014) argued that the norms entailed in the ASEAN Way account for ASEAN’s strengths and weaknesses since the rules laid out in the ASEAN Way have created shared values and a collective ASEAN identity among the region’s ruling elite, consolidating a level of mutual trust as well as deepening interstate relations through regular interaction. Yet internal conflicts with at times regional implications have been prevalent in ASEAN and have continuously raised questions as to ASEAN’s legitimacy, as the organization refrains from addressing regional conflicts and the poor human rights records of some member states. The “cliché problem” (Sukma, 2010, p. 3) of non-interference is at the core of the Association’s ongoing struggle to address regional security concerns as it restricts collective efforts at conflict resolution in order to avoid confrontation (Borchers, 2014).

This paper argues, however, that despite the ongoing primacy of the state in ASEAN theoretical discourse on security, nevertheless there has been a gradual evolution in policy-making and practice to reflect a more human-centered conceptualization. Thus, the region may be less of an outlier in terms of adherence to universalism and humanitarian norms than is generally assumed. In ASEAN’s discourse, the terminology “people-oriented” and “people-centred” tend to be employed in connection with certain types of threat, such as disaster, poverty, environmental issues, diseases, transnational crimes, trafficking, and so on, providing a segue to the human security dimensions of contemporary global humanitarianism. Thus, this paper contends that the state-centric, non-interference ASEAN Way has been evolving gradually to embrace, to an unprecedented degree,
human security perspectives. It demonstrates that this transformative change has resulted from three main catalysts: transnational challenges in the region, the influence of Japanese development aid, and the role of multilateral “tracked” diplomacy.

The article begins by exploring the evolution of the ASEAN Way concept and illustrating how it has come to embrace human security perspectives. This leads to an exploration of the catalyst behind such a shift. The article concludes that human security is certainly compatible with the contemporary understandings of the ASEAN Way in as much as the notion of people-centricity may be integrated into public policy-making. This amounts to a strategy to make the public more responsive to the execution of ASEAN policies and to demonstrate the direct benefits for the citizen from cooperation.

The Evolution of the ASEAN Way

The fundamental characteristics of the ASEAN Way, as defined in its main principles, are consensus-based decision-making and non-interference in the internal affairs of member countries (Heller, 2005). In other words, sovereignty lies at the heart of the ASEAN way. Thus, it can be viewed as an Asian method of dealing with common regional problems so as to protect the independence of the sovereign member states (von Feigenblatt, 2009). Article two of the ASEAN Charter clearly identifies these principles of the ASEAN Way:

…respect for independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all ASEAN Member states; and non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN member states; respect for the right of every Member State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion and coercion. (ASEAN, 2008, p. 6)

Borchers (2014) argued that, since the late 1990s, ASEAN has had to manage a range of security issues. These include among others, transnational crime and terrorism as well as natural and man-made environmental disasters. Together, these new security challenges have helped initiate a gradual shift towards a more qualified form of sovereignty that allowed some degree of interference among member states. Sukma (2008, p. 147) further argued that while the doctrine of non-interference continues to remain relevant in the ASEAN, it needs to be interpreted in the context of member states’ interdependence and their vulnerability to transboundary issues and spillover effects of domestic events in member countries. Bellamy and Drummond (2011, p. 196) also asserted that “many Southeast Asian states are moving away from the traditional notion of sovereignty… towards accepting a localized variant of sovereignty as responsibility” that allows for criticism of domestic policies and limited diplomatic pressure in the event of humanitarian crises.

Meanwhile, Nischalke (2000), Sharpe (2001), and Horn (1984) argued that though many within and outside of ASEAN put an emphasis on the ASEAN way of non-interference and consensus-based decision-making process, ASEAN decision-makers violate it when necessary. Thus, these principles of non-interference are not as powerful among the elites as frequently argued by outside critics. Rather than local “norms,” they can be considered as intra-regional “rules.” Such rules of autonomy might come from ASEAN member’s common “interests” (Bae, 2014a).

Caballero-Anthony and Haywood (2010, p. 7) noted a gradual shift in attitudes towards the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference, with “regional” security concerns at times outweighing concerns over “interference.” They concluded that “the ‘ASEAN way’ is not an entirely static concept and what is considered interference in the domestic affairs of a country is an ever-widening notion” (Caballero-Anthony & Haywood, 2010, p. 5).

Thus, a range of internal and external stimuli have contributed to a reassessment of the primacy of state sovereignty and security in ASEAN, and a gradual acknowledgement of the centrality of the individual in contemporary security discourse and international policy-making. These non-traditional, trans-state, and sub-state security challenges, and the shift in referent object from an exclusive focus on the state to a holistic approach embracing international security, national security, and the vulnerabilities of communities, and individuals have collectively
been referred to as “new security challenges.” The characteristics of such challenges include some or all of the following: a focus on non-military rather than military threats; transnational rather than national threats; and multilateral or collective rather than self-help security solutions (Acharya, 2002; Waever, 1995). In addition to the role played by Japanese development assistance addressed later in this article, Japan has also been instrumental in pushing forward the evolution of security conceptualization at the global level, providing many of the policy initiatives and much of the impetus for the development of the human security discourse, and acting as the largest contributor to the human security–related practices and intuitions of the United Nations (UN).

Human security suggests that international security, traditionally defined with its territorial emphasis, does not necessarily correlate with the concept of security for the individuals who comprise the state, and that an over-emphasis upon state security can be to the detriment of human welfare needs. Indeed, traditional concepts of state security may constitute a necessary condition of human welfare, but they are far from sufficient (Newman, 2010, p. 79). Human security is non-hegemonic in that the major impetus for the development of the paradigm has come from academics, from middle-ranked powers like Canada and Japan rather than the United States, and from international organizations and their spokespersons (Mushakoji, 2012, p. 1). As such, the concept and its policy prescriptions may be more resistant to charges of Western imperialism and potentially more acceptable to Southeast Asian states than those of the controversial universal human rights regime. Over two decades after the seminal United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report on New Dimensions of Human Security “the concept of human security has made significant contribution, not only by broadening the scope of security horizontally to non-military activities but also by shifting the reference point of security vertically from state to individuals” (Takasu, 2012, p. 2).

The complexity of threats in people’s daily lives now involve transnational dimensions and have moved beyond national security, which focused solely on the threat of external military aggressions. Such threats range from poverty, unemployment, drugs, terrorism, environmental degradation, and social disintegration (UNDP, 1994, p. 11). The international community has also begun to see security threats not only between but also within states and focus on people in addition to states (World Health Organization [WHO], 2002, p. 218). The three pillars of human security—freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity—have engendered much debate, and no little amount of controversy among academics and practitioners. Major areas of disagreement and contestation revolve around narrow versus broad definitions (focusing on one, two, or all three pillars), and theoretical versus practical applications of the concept (Owen, 2004, p. 374).

When introducing the human security concept, the UNDP pointed out that security in the past had been more closely connected to states than to people (Howe, 2013). This has certainly been the case in Southeast Asia, which has been often viewed within the realist framework of deterrence, containment, and balance of power, since the region places a high value on state sovereignty in international and regional relations (Nishikawa, 2007, p. 44). Similarly, most security concepts introduced in the region, such as “common security,” “mutual security,” and “cooperative security,” reflect such state-centric approaches. For example, one of the most widely used security concepts in the region, that of “comprehensive” security emphasizes a holistic view that includes both military and non-military threats, yet it does so in relation to the overall well-being of states (Capie & Evans, 2002, p. 64–75). Yet although perhaps late converts to the paradigm, the Member States of ASEAN have not been able to remain impervious to its dictates.

Human Security has been adopted by several important middle powers such as Canada, Australia, and Japan, most of them are major donors in the region. Since it has been the approach/concept used by most international NGOs and donor agencies in Southeast Asia, many scholars have assessed the extent to which the ASEAN Way is compatible with human security (Nishikawa, 2009; von Feigenblatt, 2009). They find fundamental differences between the two paradigms. The ASEAN way stresses that the referent of security is the sovereign nation-state, whereas Human Security claims that the referent of security is the individual.
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Also, the ASEAN way promotes the gradual and voluntary cooperation of nation-states in order to achieve comprehensive security, while Human Security favors short- and mid-term decisive action with or without the cooperation of nation-states. Nishikawa (2009) further argued that a particular Southeast Asian style of diplomacy or code of conduct that has evolved in intra-ASEAN relations, frames the fundamental order of these relationships. The ASEAN Way, accordingly, contributes to limiting the application of human security and thus the resolution of internal conflicts in Southeast Asia.

The foremost challenge of human security to the Southeast Asian operating environment is found in its core idea; that is, defining people/individuals as the main referent object of security (Nishikawa, 2009; von Feigenblatt, 2009). Human security necessitates identifying security threats from the perspective of vulnerable individuals and groups (Howe, 2013). In ASEAN, security discourse had been traditionally identified from the perspectives of the state. Human security questions the state-centric identifications of threat that such an approach entails. Human security varies widely among the ASEAN Member States. Thailand is noteworthy in that it has adopted human security in its diplomatic and national administration policy-making, while much of the rest of ASEAN appears wedded to the concept of comprehensive security as their official security policy (Bae, 2014a). The Philippines is another possible exception in that the administration of Benigno Aquino III, which came to power in 2010, recognized human security as part of its national security policy (Bae, 2014a) (although the current incumbent, Rodrigo Duterte, seems bent on reversing this trend).

Accordingly, if applied, the human security approach may drastically change security management strategies, priorities, and methods, because threats for the state and those for people are often, if not always, different. Nishikawa (2009) pointed out that policymakers in the ASEAN are still wary of the liberal interventionist connotations of the concept. The evidence is that the term human security has not generally been employed, despite ASEAN’s emphasis on ‘one caring and sharing community.’

Following the declaration of Bali Concorde II signed on October 2003, a “people-centred ASEAN” has become something of a buzzword in the region. This term has been embraced in subsequent high-level meetings in ASEAN including the annual summit of leaders (Morada, 2008). The Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) for 2004-2010, a six-year plan designed to initiate ASEAN community building comprising three pillars—Economic, Security, and Socio-Cultural Community—also emphasized ASEAN’s people-centred approach (ASEAN, 2004, p.16). The idea of a people-centred ASEAN was introduced in the ASEAN socio-cultural community, which is “linked inextricably with the economic and security pillars of the ASEAN Community” (ASEAN, 2004, p. 16).

The term even became more en vogue when ASEAN leaders, in their meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 2005, decided that the time had come for the organization to begin its process of transformation through an ASEAN Charter (Morada, 2008). Based on the 2004 Vientiane Action Program, in the 2005 Summit, the leaders agreed to confer ASEAN a legal personality by drafting an ASEAN Charter that would serve as a constitution of ASEAN (ASEAN, 2005). The newly democratic Indonesian government was a particularly strong advocate of ASEAN’s turn towards developing a liberal space during the institutionalization process set in place since 2003.

At the ASEAN ministerial meeting in July 2007, the members reached a consensus on institutionalizing a set of liberal principles including the rule of law, good governance, and respect for fundamental freedom within the newly established ASEAN Charter and building the ASEAN Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) (Katsumata, 2009). In addition, the governments signed the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers. Moreover, ASEAN leaders agreed to establish the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) distinct from the AICHR. At the 12th ASEAN Summit in January 2007, in a speech entitled “One Caring and Sharing Community,” the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo stated:
We stressed that the ASEAN community we are building shall be a community of peoples caring for and sharing their human, natural and cultural resources and strengths for their common good and mutual benefit. (ASEAN, 2007)

Although the ASEAN Charter, adopted at the 13th ASEAN summit in November 2007, maintains the traditional emphasis on principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference, it adheres to numerous liberal notions, such as democratization, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the empowerment of civil society (ASEAN, 2008, p. 2). It also emphasizes promoting a people-oriented ASEAN as an approach that was to be implemented in ASEAN’s key areas of cooperation: economic, political-security, and socio-cultural. In this regard, the Charter proposes “to promote a people-oriented ASEAN in which all sectors of society are encouraged to participate in, and benefit from, the process of ASEAN integration and community building” (ASEAN, 2008, p. 5).

Interestingly, Chandra (2009, p. 200) distinguished between a people-oriented ASEAN and a people-centred ASEAN. According to Chandra (2009), the former indicates that the policies are for the people, and are therefore the provenance of ASEAN officials, while a people-centred ASEAN implies that the policies and principles are determined by the people, as stressed by civil society. With regard to this point, civil society groups, such as Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA), proclaim that the ASEAN Charter fails to put people at the center as it refers repeatedly to the people-oriented concept, but employs little in terms of people-centred terminology (Oga, 2014). Such groups, therefore, believe a people-oriented ASEAN to be insufficient for the promotion of democracy, protection of human rights, and empowerment of civil society, because it denies the people a more active participatory role.

The final version of the Charter that was signed by the ASEAN leaders was certainly less progressive than that of the final report of an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on the ASEAN Charter, submitted to the 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu in 2007, which contained a number of more people-oriented recommendations such as: 1) the creation of a regional human rights mechanism; 2) inclusion of international humanitarian law and the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle; 3) non-consensus-based decision–making; and 4) creation of consultative mechanisms with non-state actors (Morada, 2008). It seems that some member countries were worried about the rapid inclusion of civil society in the decision-making procedure since democratic governance and civil society movements might challenge their non- or semi-democratic legitimacy (Gerard, 2013).

Nevertheless, at the 27th ASEAN Summit in November 2015, ASEAN leaders adopted ASEAN Community Vision 2025, which was intended to direct the community’s activities in the next decade. In this document, a people-centred, people-oriented community has been emphasized in order to maintain ASEAN as globally active and relevant (ASEAN, 2015). The ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025, which builds on the Blueprint 2015, includes a number of human-centric reinforcing elements including a people-oriented and people-centred ASEAN (ASEAN, 2015, p. 5).

Thus, although ASEAN made virtually no reference to human security in its official documents, this paper argues that, in ASEAN’s discourse, the notion of people-oriented and people-centred tends to be employed in connection with certain types of threat, for example, disaster, poverty, environmental issues, diseases, transnational crimes, and trafficking, which reflect links to human security considerations. Since the adoption of the ASEAN Charter and the invigoration of subsequent civil society movements, a gradual transformation of ASEAN’s institutional mechanisms into a more people-oriented process has taken place. This paper contends, therefore, that the state-centric, non-interference ASEAN Way has been evolving towards the embrace of human security perspectives to an unprecedented degree. The coexistence of two important theoretical trends in the ASEAN region, namely human security, as expressed in the concepts of people-centred or people-oriented and the ongoing importance of the ASEAN way, is a clear indication that the region is in a state of flux.
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The Catalysts Behind the Shift

Transnational Challenges in the Region

Transnational challenges faced by the region since 1997 have constituted major catalysts for this change (Acharyya, 2007, p. 12). Amitav Acharyya (2007, p. 22–26) identified four such major challenges: the Asian financial crisis during and after 1997; the 9/11 attacks on the United States and the terrorist bombings in Southeast Asia in subsequent years; the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003; and the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. Of these, the most significant episode, according to Acharyya (2007, p. 22), was the 1997 financial crisis, which led to increased poverty levels and damaged the social, educational, and numerous other aspects of the well-being of people in the region, particularly in Indonesia and Thailand. Indeed, the World Bank described this crisis as “the biggest setback for poverty reduction in East Asia for several decades” (Acharyya, 2013, p. 241). Due to the crisis, ASEAN not only had to shore up its international credibility, but also, to an even greater extent, its intramural legitimacy.

At the same time, ASEAN’s regional mechanism of decision-making began to come under pressure from democratic and civil society forces concerned about what the Asian financial crisis revealed about structural and procedural shortcomings. In particular, non-governmental groups shifted their attention to regional governance. Together with members of the academia and the media, they spearheaded increasingly vociferous demands to transcend ASEAN’s elitist and state-centric nature, to jettison the grouping’s sacred non-interference norm, and to democratize regional governance by creating more participatory channels (Caballero-Anthony, 2008). Thus, David Shambaugh (2008, p. 3) has identified international relations in the region as an increasingly two-level game, whereby societies of the region are interconnected to an unprecedented degree. What Nyan Chanda (2008, p. 307) referred to as the “New Preachers”—NGOs and civil society community activists—have sprouted in many countries in the region to uphold humanitarian causes and issues, and to pressure governments and corporations. These activists have also linked with international bodies and fellow activists in other countries for coordination and support. Thus, the constant diffusion of information and the rise of civil society activism form mutually reinforcing trends (Chanda, 2008, p. 308-309).

Governance in the region has, therefore, increasingly been impacted by the growing influence of networks of NGOs, as well as by the growing activism of these networks. Civil society organizations have started to “build constituencies for peace” wherein they seek to influence policies and programs that can engender people-centred security systems instead of state-centric security systems deemed inadequate to address the growing threats to security of individuals and societies (Caballero-Anthony, 2004, p. 166–167). In fact, in 1998, following the Asian financial crisis, and in response to pressure from internal constituencies, the human security concept was introduced during a session of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) (Sukma, 2012).

Terrorism also highlighted the necessity for personal safety and public security measures. These concerns were, however, tempered by discussion of the curtailment of civil liberties. Furthermore, while the globalized nature of the new terrorist threat, and the regionalized impact (though local affiliates), focused attention on security vulnerabilities at all levels, the U.S. led response met with a mixed reception among ASEAN leaders. The “War on Terror” came across as uncomfortably close to an anti-Islamic crusade for many countries of the region with Muslim majorities, or at least significant Muslim minorities. And there were concerns that the “War” could actually be counter-productive, stimulating rather than discouraging radicalization in the region. Instead, regional leaders increasingly looked for local solutions to local problems. These included consideration of human security and holistic or inclusive security initiatives in regions with long-running Islamic insurgency problems. Thus, in Aceh in Indonesia, potentially hostile actors have been drawn into networks of exchange and mutual dependence, and former insurgents have become important players in local political economies (Aspinall, 2016 p. 167).

Likewise, in Southeast Asia’s longest running conflict, that between the government of the Philippines and Muslim separatists in the Mindanao region,
a comprehensive peace treaty was finally brokered in 2012. The October Agreement addressed the human and comprehensive security issues, such as identity, development, and community, in clauses which were listed before those covering the traditional bugbears of security, political rights, and zero-sum considerations of the extent of territory. This interest-based and comprehensive approach to good governance covering all elements of human security and development appears to have been better received than previous top-down models. Hence, when announcing the deal on October 7, 2012, President Aquino noted that “This framework agreement paves the way for a final and enduring peace in Mindanao,” and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Vice Chairman Ghazali Jaafar was quoted as saying “We are very happy. We thank the president for this” (McGeown, 2012). While any celebrations were premature, at least this agreement revealed a shift in security thinking.

The SARS crisis drew attention to the need for better health facilities. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has estimated the cost of SARS in the Asian region as being around US$60 billion (ADB, 2003). In addition, according to Saywell and Fowler (2003), the impact of SARS extended to flights to the region, retail sales, and hotel-room occupancy rates. Goh Chok Tong, Singapore’s prime minister at the time, commented that “this crisis is not just a crisis of SARS, it is also a crisis of fear, people fear catching SARS” (cited in Acharya, 2007, p. 32). Similar observations would be made in relation to the outbreak of avian flu. Consequences of the 2003–2004 outbreaks were noticed not only on the poultry sector in the region where smallholder farmers are heavily dependent on poultry production but also on losses to tourism, especially in the cases of Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia (Verbiest & Castillo, 2004; FAO, 2005). This outbreak called for increased regional cooperation among the ASEAN member states. In December 2004, ASEAN established a task force to respond to the spread of avian flu in the region (ASEAN Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza [HPAI] Task Force). Responsibility was divided among the five original members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.

A more recent and comprehensive initiative was the establishment of the ASEAN Technical Working Group on Pandemic Preparedness (ASEAN-TWG). As part of the phase two of ASEAN’s work on pandemic preparedness (2007-2009), the ASEAN-TWG aims to conduct assessment in each country to identify gaps according to a multi-sectoral planning framework. This body brings together representatives from the human health, animal health, and disaster management sectors. The ultimate aim is to encourage and help countries to set up national-level committees to coordinate plans for a regional, multi-sectoral pandemic preparedness and respond mechanisms (Caballero-Anthony, 2012).

The economic costs of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami were even more onerous. But of perhaps greater significance was the fact that the majority of the tsunami’s victims were poor people living in villages, slums, and shanty-towns; a vast proportion of them children (Acharya, 2007, p. 32–34). The tsunami put pressure on states to bring a human dimension to their approach to security and development, demonstrating as it did the extent to which a regime’s security could be undermined by acute crises (Acharya, 2007, p. 23–24). In a statement that confirms how crises such as the 2004 tsunami can stimulate a review of security discourse and a re-examination of human security in Southeast Asia, Surin Pitsuwan, former foreign minister of Thailand and later head of ASEAN, put the matter as follows:

In Southeast Asia today, the so-called non-traditional security issues are becoming traditional security issues. The traditional way of dealing with them is no longer adequate. All the crises we have experienced in the last five years, while the roots may be different, all of them have human security dimensions. (cited in Acharya, 2007, p. 24–25)

These dynamics became evident in ASEAN’s response to cyclone Nargis that devastated parts of Myanmar in 2008. ASEAN, long criticized for its hands-off approach towards the military junta-led regime, raised concerns over human security and eventually responded assertively despite initial concerns over the prerogative of non-interference. Nargis triggered the largest humanitarian operation ever coordinated by ASEAN, and the organization successfully mediated between the military regime in
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Myanmar and international aid donors, diminishing fears of political intervention in order to manage the humanitarian crisis (Emmerson, 2008, p. 45). Although critics pointed out the non-political nature of ASEAN’s involvement, some observers argued that the cyclone “transformed Myanmar from ASEAN’s embarrassment into its opportunity” (Emmerson, 2008, p. 45), as the Association’s relationship with the regime became an asset in the aftermath of the disaster (Bellamy & Drummond, 2011).

The experience highlighted the need for more formal mechanisms to facilitate a coordinated regional response to such disasters (Borchers, 2014). This multi-faceted approach widens the security discourse in the region towards a pluralistic response to security challenges, further eroding the Westphalian logic of state-centered security (Sukma, 2008). Then-ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, who was credited with putting pressure on Myanmar to cooperate, later proclaimed, “this is the New ASEAN – a community that puts people at the centre of concern” (Pitsuwan, 2008). The response to Nargis highlighted ASEAN’s efforts at “worrying around the sensitivities to external interference and avoiding charges of intrusion by emphasizing the cooperative character of the NTS agenda in which sovereignty is not trumped or superseded, but rather, pooled” (Caballero-Anthony, 2008, p. 207). Since Nargis, this approach has been further institutionalized.

The adoption of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) provided the grouping with a legal instrument binding all members to promote cooperation in reducing the impacts of disaster and act jointly to provide emergency response. Since its establishment, the AHA Center has been very active, not only in providing information related to disasters in the ASEAN region but also in planning and undertaking joint responses to help victims of disasters in ASEAN Member States (Sukma, 2012).

Influence of Japan’s Development Aid

Japan, one of the leading international proponents of the human security concept, has been a major aid provider to Southeast Asia. As a defeated ex-colonial power, after the Pacific War, Japan was obliged to compensate South Vietnam, Indonesia, Burma, and the Philippines, and in addition, chose to give aid as a form of compensation to Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. Tokyo established a Fund for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia administered through the Eximbank of Japan, to assist Southeast Asian countries to promote their economic development and had provided US$1,152 million in damages and US$737 million in loans by the end of the 1960s (Howe, 2013). In addition, as Japan achieved rapid economic growth with an average annual rate of 10%, its aid grew exponentially (Sueo, 2002). In the following period from the 1970s to 1980s, Japan provided large contributions to Southeast Asia in the form of soft yen loans (Howe, 2013). In 1977 when Japan’s reparation payments came to an end, Tokyo designed an “aid-doubling plan.” This was successfully implemented as Japan’s ODA of US$1.4 billion in 1977, had more than doubled by the end of 1980 to US$3.3 billion, and reached US$10 billion in 1988 (Howe, 2013). Japan has also been particularly supportive in political and economic terms of the process of ASEAN integration, facilitating the construction of a zone of peace within which freedom from fear has been considerably enhanced, and as a result of which a peace dividend has been generated and win-win economic cooperation encouraged (Yoshimatsu & Trinidad, 2010).

Following violent anti-Japanese demonstrations in Southeast Asian capitals in 1974 during visits by then Premier Kakuei Tanaka, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda announced in 1977 what was to become known as the “Fukuda doctrine,” which stated that Japan would reject a military role in the region in favor of “heart-to-heart dialogues” (Singh, 2002, p. 284). This was a rational, clearly thought out, and ultimately effective non-traditional response to a threat to Japanese interests. Japan has continued with such overtures under successive administrations. While human security was introduced to the mainstream of Japanese foreign policy by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi in 1998, a similar concept was first outlined as a key foreign policy perspective and main objective of Japanese ODA disbursement in 1995 (Fukushima, 2003, p. 132). According to a speech by Prime Minister
Tomiichi Murayama at the UN World Summit for Social Development held in Copenhagen in 1995, Japan was trying to create a “human-centered society” and emphasized “human-centered social development” as a focus of Japanese ODA (Murayama, 1995), thereby further embedding the notion of a strategic link between development, human security, and Japanese foreign and state security policy.

The 1997 financial crisis in Asia, especially, stimulated Japan to take specific action to support vulnerable people in terms of human security in order to gain leadership in the region (Takasu, 2011). In 1998, during the international symposium “Health Initiative in Asian Economic Crisis: Human-Centered Approach,” Keizo Obuchi, Japanese Prime Minister at the time, brought up human security in his opening address for the first time. He indicated that Japanese ODA should be offered to promote social development, including public health, in order to enhance the “human safety” of these individuals. In that year, the Japanese government announced to provide 500 million yen (4.2 million US dollars) for the establishment of the Trust Fund for Human Security (TFHS) under the United Nations, making the trust fund the largest of its kind established in the UN.

The UN TFHS was launched in 1999 with the aim of “promoting human security through the protection and empowerment of people and communities threatened in their survival, livelihood and dignity.” It is initially intended to be a tool for launching ODA projects in Asia. In 2003, Japan announced human security as one of five basic policies in their revised Official Development Assistance Charter (MOFA, 2003). In terms of geographic dispersal and regional prioritization, Japan has earmarked the lion’s share of its assistance for Asia, particularly to Southeast Asian countries, with which Japan has close relationships and within which Japanese aid can have a major impact upon stability and prosperity. The Obuchi administration realized that “Japan could become a leader in the sense of creating universally accepted values, if it adopted and preached the virtues of human security alongside its recognized role as the world’s largest aid donor, which role it had kept up throughout the 1990s despite its economic problems” (Edström, 2008, p. 223).

It is important to understand the implication of Japanese development and humanitarian projects in Southeast Asia. As was explained in the previous section, the region is guided by the principles behind the ASEAN way and has to deal with donors who hold a view of human security, ranging from a “freedom from fear” view to that of “freedom from want.” Thus, most major donors operating in the region have a transformative view of humanitarian and development aid. Democracy and the universality of human rights are considered to be ideals to strive for. Donors have an “idealized” view of a future for Southeast Asian States as liberal democracies that respect human rights. At a theoretical level this is clearly incompatible with the goals and principles of prominent members of regional elites. Some important examples of this are the military Junta in Myanmar and reactionary forces in Thailand. Both groups reject the universality of human rights and even of democracy. Nevertheless, regional ruling elites need external aid in order to pursue development for development’s sake and for regime stability. They are therefore, to a certain extent, compelled to embrace human security, at least from the more limited perspectives of freedom from fear and developmental notions of freedom from absolute want.

The Role of Multilateral “Tracked” Diplomacy

The change in ASEAN security norms can also, in part, be explained through examination of how ASEAN multilateral and multitrack diplomacy works (Howe, 2013). There are different interpretations of how many tracks are involved in multitrack diplomacy ranging from two, to three, to as many as nine. There are, naturally therefore, different conceptualizations of what is encapsulated by each track. The simplest conceptualization is of Track I referring to the traditional “art of diplomacy” wherein the official representatives of states (statesmen) engage in a strategic dance with their counterparts to gain advantage for their country. Track II is everything else. A more nuanced interpretation considers the formal channel of communication between states through official representatives of governments to be Track I diplomacy. Other dialogues taking place outside Track I, involving experts and government
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officials operating outside of their formal or official diplomatic remit are referred to as Track II. Track III refers to non-governmental sectors, society to society engagement, and independent academics with different agendas to those propelled by Track I and Track II. This is the definition we will use in this paper, as it is more nuanced than the first simplistic definition, but we have insufficient space to assess as many as nine different strands of diplomacy in this section.

Track I and Track II agendas are often similar due to the reliance of the latter on the personnel of the former, or the reliance of the former on policy advice from the latter. Some commentators, therefore, refer to Track 1.5 to denote a situation in which official and non-official actors work together to resolve conflicts (USIP). In Southeast Asia, however, Track II Diplomacy, known as private-citizen diplomacy, has acquired a peculiar and distinct form (Kim, 2001). Paralleling the formal dialogues that are held in the region, Track II has evolved into a plethora of multilateral exchanges designed to help governments deal with issues ranging from economic cooperation to peacekeeping and conflict prevention. It has proliferated either because of governmental uncertainty on how to proceed with sensitive discussions or because of a lack of professional expertise. In addition, Track II diplomacy has taken the initiative in building relationships among members of the informal groupings before enlarging the circle further to include influential decision makers at the top. As such, in Southeast Asia, Track II diplomacy has had an extensive impact independent of that of Track I, and also, has opened doors for Track III to play a greater role.

Thus, the change in ASEAN security norms can in part be accounted for through an exploration of ASEAN multilateral track of diplomacy. The prevailing norms in the official track participated by ASEAN leaders and officials are state-centric. The unofficial track was originally designed to mirror the official agendas; consequently, no difference existed until recently when there were more interactions with the non-governmental sectors. Thus, the role played by non-governmental sectors in advancing a more human-centric agenda in ASEAN is instrumental in accounting for the change in security norms. International pressure from the United Nations, and other dialogue partner countries which already subscribe to human security norms, has also been responsible for inducing changes towards more human-centric concept in ASEAN. Yet in terms of multitrack diplomacy, the role of the non-governmental sectors in changing ASEAN security norms has been most prominent.

The Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (Working Group) has been the main instrument of Track II and Track III (perhaps Track 2.5?) human security diplomatic input. The Working Group emerged in July 1995, with its secretariat based in the Human Rights Center of the Ateneo de Manila University in the Philippines, and is an informal coalition of individuals and groups within the ASEAN region who are working in government offices, parliamentary human right committees, academic institutions, and NGOs and who are concerned with protection and promotion of human rights (Phan, 2008). It has pursued a number of initiatives challenging the ASEAN way. These have paved the way for the establishment of a regional human rights mechanism, conceived as an intergovernmental body promoting human rights in cooperation with civil society. Among other things, the Working Group has sought acknowledgement as an “important catalyst for the promotion of human rights in ASEAN.” Efforts have been directed towards the establishment of a national human rights institution in every ASEAN country, and also an ASEAN declaration on human rights as a basis for the establishment of a regional mechanism. The membership has also promoted the creation of a unit within the ASEAN Secretariat to focus on human rights-related concerns within the region (Haacke, 2005, p. 231).

The decision to establish a regional mechanism was founded on the accumulated efforts by diverse non-governmental actors (Davies, 2013). Civil society in Asia had come together since the early 1980s to work for the establishment of a regional human rights mechanism. The end of the Cold War brought the region into a more open environment for building regional coalitions on multiple levels. The voice for human rights from non-governmental sphere and academics became stronger. The ASEAN-Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) network started the Colloquium on Human Rights in 1994, and
facilitated the processes for cooperation at the non-governmental level. With support from private donor organizations, ASEAN-ISIS built a regional coalition of individuals and groups from ASEAN countries in 1995, dubbed the Regional Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, and established it as an ASEAN dialogue partner in 1998. The Working Group launched diverse workshops and proposals to move forward the intergovernmental process of human rights in the region (Vitit, 1999). Forum Asia, a pan-region coalition of NGOs, was also formed in order to advocate for a human rights mechanism at the ASEAN level and engaged in multiple programs to encourage formation of an official regional body (Bae, 2014b).

According to Gerard (2013), the two most enduring civil society organizations (CSOs) are the ASEAN People Assembly (APA), organized by ASEAN-ISIS and held seven times from 2000 to 2009, and the ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC), organized by the Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy network and held nine times from 2005 to the present.

The APA brought together several hundred participants from across Southeast Asia for discussions on issues such as globalization, poverty, women’s empowerment, human rights, good governance, and the environment. The Assembly saw itself as a counterpoint to the “fraternity of government officials” that is ASEAN. As this phrase indicates, the starting point for APA was the argument that ASEAN states have failed to create a moral commitment and a personal sense of unity amongst their peoples. At the same time, the idea of an APA builds on the realization that for NGOs to be successful in influencing intergovernmental dialogues, it is necessary for regional civil society to have some institutionalized expression and the capacity to act regionally.

The APA, which aimed to realize the ability of NGOs to influence intergovernmental dialogues, was superseded by the ACSC, due to the growing engagement of the states. For some, the expanding repertoire of tactics used by states to impact on the ACSC has challenged the vision of the ACSC as an independent space for advocacy and indicated the hollowness of ASEAN’s commitment to creating a people-oriented Association (Gerard, 2013). Yet at the same time, the participation of the states in these processes reflects the importance attached to them by governments even while at the same time trying to co-opt them.

Conclusion

This paper argues that ASEAN has made considerable progress towards adapting to the changing security environment, most notably in embracing human security perspectives. This supports Emmerson’s (2008)’s argument that the norms framing Southeast Asian security cooperation are slowly succumbing to the changing security environment regional governments have to face as they have to consider whether and when to prioritize human security over state security. When the human security paradigm came to prominence in international discourse after the end of the Cold War, it still seemed unlikely that it would gain much traction in the still decidedly Westphalian East Asian region in general, and in ASEAN in particular. The intervening decades have, however, witnessed an attitudinal change among ASEAN’s ruling elites (Cheeppensook, 2007).

ASEAN’s response to a range of non-traditional security issues in recent years, such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 2002–2004 SARS outbreak, the 2003–2004 avian flu outbreak, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, and the impact of cyclone Nargis in 2008, suggests that these new challenges have contributed to a realignment of the ASEAN Way. In response to the considerable influence of the Japanese government’s promotion of human security, and with significant Japanese support, ASEAN has embedded freedom from want into the ongoing changes in the region in the course of promoting a people-centred approach. Also, through utilizing multilateral tracked diplomacy, ASEAN has not only shifted its own policy position to one reflecting more flexibility on the question of state sovereignty and non-interference, but it has also opened up policy space to grassroots movements which are more inclined to support human security and development rather than state-centric, macro, and aggregate measurements of security and development. The consensus-based model of governance and interaction in Southeast Asia then serves to further facilitate civil society pressures. These Track III
approaches are likely to prove increasingly influential in the most wired and connected region of the world, leading to a further diffusion of intra- and inter-regional norms and an overlapping consensus concerning the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and provide havens free from fear and want.

Allowing that ASEAN has been a member-driven, loosely structured intergovernmental association with a low level of institutionalization and a Secretariat with no mandate, the scope of this paper is nevertheless limited to regional institutional mechanisms rather than focus on factors that stem from individual member states. In 2017, ASEAN celebrates its 50th Anniversary. The achievements of ASEAN over the past 50 years in human security are at best, patchy, appearing in vision statements but short on substance. The onus is now upon the new generation of leaders in ASEAN begin to push for greater institutionalization of human security, particularly through consideration of the views and inputs of non-state actors and civil society groups in the process of consultation.

The role of CSOs and NGOs has in fact become an indispensable element in the process of ensuring and promoting human security (Sukma, 2012). For ASEAN to remain relevant, it has to be committed to applying the human security perspective, thereby transforming ASEAN into a truly people-centred organization. The recognition by the governments of ASEAN Member States of the important role of CSOs and NGOs is a necessary first step to bring the people back in to the regional security discourse. Also, as most human security problems originate from the domestic domain of states, it is essential for each individual state to strengthen its national capacity to address these and other domestic problems.

References

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